PART I

ADDENDUM

Since this paper touches indirectly on the events of September 11,2001, it seemed appropriate to add this addendum. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. were most likely motivated in part by a hatred of modernity. This is relevant to the paper, for in it I discuss some important elements of American political philosophy which are particularly modern. I begin with an observation that while the country has until recently been very well off materially, we have also and for some time now found ourselves in a situation of moral and spiritual malaise and even decline. Our sense of this paradox has been heightened since the end of the cold war in 1989, a situation in which we saw ourselves as winning the argument over what kind of system was most conducive to a good life. It is not clear upon close analysis, however, that Americans have a strong sense of what makes life worth living. In light of what seems to be a paradox at first sight, then, one of the questions I ask in the paper is: Is there a relationship between the distinctly modern assumptions within the American world view and the sense of a moral-spiritual decline many sense we are experiencing today? I believe we can shed light on this question by looking at it in view of modern political philosophy. The latter brings to the foreground a tension at the heart of human existence. This tension, or conflict, arises out of the following paradox: The pursuit of "the greatest things" does not entail the attainment of the material needs of the body. Stated more simply, if we spent all our time doing philosophy or in contemplation of the divine we would not be able to obtain the basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Furthermore, sometimes the pursuit of the highest ends leads to fanaticism and this can be disruptive to attaining these needs. The sense of malaise and even decline, then, may in part come from the high degree of emphasis the founders of modern political thought placed on setting up a political, social and economic structure which was conducive to order and security, but which did not give much weight to those aspects of human life which are not merely instrumental but which are good for their own sake.

If the modem West in general, and America in particular, is viewed as a set of institutional and cultural edifices which make society more stable by removing questions of religion from the public realm, the tension between the needs of the body and daily affairs of the city, on the one hand, and the needs of the soul, on the other is ever present in Plato's dialogues. Plato suggests that this tension is a part of human nature and will not be overcome. In light of Plato's assumption that this tension will always be with us, I want to suggest that the terrorist attacks on the U.S. may at least in part be understood as violent "eruptions" against certain philosophical assumptions of American civilization in particular. It is possible to view the attacks of September 11, 2001 as symptoms of the kinds of tensions thematically presented in the Apology. Just as Socrates got in trouble for introducing reason into the city and thereby being perceived as a threat to the gods of Athens, the United States, a product of the Enlightenment, seems to be causing anger on the part of some in parts of the world largely outside the influence of Western philosophy and who understand themselves as pious. If Plato is correct, the modem solution to the problem of politics has not obliterated the tension between philosophy and the city; between the pursuit of the "greatest things" and the attainment of order, security and material well being. The Anglo-American solution to this problem viewed in this light may have merely suppressed it.

By discussing the tension which is entailed in the philosophy animating American civilization, I do not mean to suggest that the solution the modern political philosophers offered to cure perennial ills of European life ought be altered in any fundamental way. What I do mean to argue is that while the modems seem to have tried to obliterate conflicts and tensions arising out of disagreements about final ends, in particular by reorienting individuals from a focus on the otherworldly to a focus on the here and now, we in philosophy need to make a serious attempt to assist individuals in finding a new balance in the relative emphasis placed on these two kinds of goods, or ends. To be aware of a starkly different way of ordering the goods of the body and soul than that found in America in particular and the modem West more generally is important both for our self-understanding as well as our understanding of the larger world in which we exist.1   In the context of this paper I argue that we in philosophy need to begin a self-conscious discussion of "the greatest things", with the goal in mind of heightening awareness of the essential role moral ends play in human existence, doing so within the tradition of Socratic wisdom in which we acknowledge our ignorance of the "greatest things".

INTRODUCTION

The point of departure for this paper is a paradox in American society today. On the one hand, the country as a whole is in better economic shape than ever before. At the same time, many thoughtful people sense that there is something fundamentally wrong with the moral and spiritual fiber of the country. This paradox can form the basis of our thinking about a tension which is present in the political and ethical thought of such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. That tension is between what I will refer to as the moral good of the single individual, on the one hand, and the needs of the city, on the other. For the purpose of this paper, I will define the moral good as any condition which contributes to the attainment ofthe highest ends of human existence.2 In contrast, the needs of the city, or what I will sometimes refer to as the political good for society as a whole, will be defined by the external ordering of individuals into a unified society. Such order will be conceived as a necessary, but not sufficient condition, of human living. The political and moral goods together, then, will constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of a good life for both the single individual as such and the individual in his capacity as a member of society.

Historically, the political requirement of order for society as a whole has trumped the good of the individual. The American political experiment is unique in that is conceives itself to give priority to the good of the single individual. In the process of doing this, however, it redefines the good for the single individual explicitly in terms of external material well being. In this model, which forms perhaps the key plank of the modern Anglo-American political foundation, when individuals in society pursue their own material well being, they will act in a way which not only promotes their own good as now defined, but in a way which is positively conducive to the political good of order. There is no doubt that the political-economic structure coming out of this new understanding of the good for the single individual has been highly successful on a practical level. It has led to consistently high levels of stability and prosperity. In light of the problem noted at the outset of the paper, however, it is important that we consider possible costs to the moral good resulting from the modem turn away from moral ends. It is in the light of this worry, furthermore, that investigating Plato, Aristotle, and Kant's views on the moral as well as external goods is worthwhile. By considering the views of the greatest thinkers on these qualitatively different goods, we may gain insight into how to think about and constructively approach the dilemma we in America face today. In the first half of the paper, I want to give a general overview of how the tension between the moral and political good shows up in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, as well as American political thought. In the second half of the paper, I analyze how the tension is present in Kant's thought. I argue that Kant reconciles these two goods in a way which promotes the moral good while also supporting the political goal of order.

ANALYSIS

A distinction which closely parallels that between the moral and political goods as defined above shows up in Aristotle's thought. In Bk. III of The Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between the good man and the good citizen. The point of the distinction is that what makes one man good as a citizen is not synonymous with what makes one good as a human being.3 This same distinction shows up again in the Nichomachean Ethics. Throughout most of this work Aristotle argues that a good life is derived in good actions.4  In Bk. K, however, the focus shifts and he there tells us that a good life is found in contemplation of divine objects.5  There is a significant difference between the way the good life is conceived throughout most of the Ethics, then, and the way it is viewed in Book K.

The fact that the conception of the good life in Bk. K of the Ethics involves the individual in isolation from society has implications for the way we are to understand the moral good in its relation to society. The radical change in the portrayal of what makes for a good life in the first nine books of the Ethics, on the one hand, and Bk. K on the other, brings to the foreground the distinction, or more practically stated, the relationships between, the good man and the good citizen. Stated in terms used in this paper, the contrast highlights the issue of the relationship between the moral good and the needs of the city and in particular a possible tension between them.6  

The distinction between the good for the single individual and the good for society as a whole shows up again in Plato's Republic. Here as well Plato points to a tension between the pursuit of two qualitatively different kinds of goods, again, a moral good whose locus is the inner experience of the individual and a political good constituted by external order. At the outset of The Republic, Plato defines justice as minding ones own business and fulfilling the function in society that one is born for. When we analyze the components of the just city, namely, wisdom, courage and temperance, they seem to be considered good because they help attain an ordered relation among the individuals that make up society.

Plato's discussion of justice includes the assertion that justice in the individual will be identical to justice in the city.8  When Plato merely assumes the two are identical, he highlights the possibility that what makes a city virtuous is in fact not identical with what makes a single individual so. Indeed, later in Book I, Plato intimates that the discussion up to this point has not adequately captured what is being sought.9  Something else is needed if we want to more closely approximate the most important things in life, or that is, the Idea of the Good. While order is a necessary condition of the city, it is not a sufficient condition of the good life. Eventually, the discussion of justice in the city and the individual leads up to the discussion of the Idea of the Good, the peak theme of The Republic. In the Allegory, Plato portrays the Idea of the Good as being experienced by a single individual. Plato suggests that the relation to society of the one who has had this vision will be changed significantly. Whereas prior to the vision he would be at home in the city, after seeing the truth of reality he wants to remain in the light that has bestowed such sight upon im. At the same time that Plato suggests this, he draws a scenario in which this individual is compelled to return to the society and contribute to governing. What is noteworthy about the account of the return of this individual to society, then, is that Plato speaks as if this individual will naturally want to remain apart from the practical affairs of the city. In other words, in the follow up to the Allegory, he once again takes up the assumption that justice in the city and the in the individual are identical. While initially it looked as if there was a direct analogy between justice in the individual and justice in the city, when we analyze the account of motives Plato gives for the one who has attained enligthenment, we sense that there may be more than a small difference between what is good for the one who seeks the good understood deeply, on the one hand, and those who define the good in terms of the dominant opinions of the city.  By being silent regarding the fact that the motives of the one who experiences this vision may have changed in regards to the practical affairs of the city, he highlights the possibility that the good of the single individual is not identical to the good of the city.11

A similar analysis of the relation of the moral good experienced by concrete individuals to the political good of society is found in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Following his statement in Book K that contemplation may be the highest activity the single individual is capable of, Aristotle makes a move similar to the one Plato makes in Book in The Republic. He states that the activity of contemplation may be too high for a man, and that he will need to participate in society to attain his ends.12  Both Plato and Aristotle, then, portray the single individual who has a transformative experience as being in isolation. In both cases, subsequent to the account of this experience, the stress is again placed on the practical affairs entailed in living in the city.

Based on the similarity in the scenarios drawn by Plato and Aristotle, we are able to draw the following set of tentative conclusions. When a single individual has an experience similar in kind to the one experienced by the individual in the cave, his relation to the larger society will be changed. In other words, when the individual philosophizes, his view of life in general and of his surrounding society will be transformed. Prior to such a transformative vision he will likely be animated by the same kinds of concerns that most people are focused on most of the time, namely, order and material comfort. Subsequent to such an experience, Plato intimates that the individual may be motivated by a desire to pursue a more purely moral good which transcends his own more mundane needs as well as those of the city. While I have been arguing that the contrast between the good of the person as such and the good of the person as a member of society is central to both Plato and Aristotle's political and moral thought, more important perhaps than this for our purposes as citizens of modern society is the question:   What form does the good for the person as such take today, and in what ways is it conveyed to any indivdual as one who might have the intention to pursue it?  While it is more obvious that Plato is linking a vision of the good to the avoidance of what he refers to as "troubles in the city", I want to suggest a reading which does not contract this one but goes one step further. One of the most important conclusions we may draw from the complex portrayal of the relation between the two goods in Plato and Aristotle's ethics is that a transformative moral vision on the part of some individuals is necessary if the city is going to attain not merely the necessary conditions of living, but make the city conducive to striving after a good life as well. So while it seems that Plato is simply giving us what in relation to the later-discussed account of the good is a minimalistic definition of justice, and while we then are given an account of a conflict of motives between one who has experienced a transformative vision of the good and those in the city, I am arguing that lying beneath all of this is a question regarding both the source and nature of the good itself as a quality which is practical for society. I designate the quality which fills the function of making the city conducive to a good life for its members as quality 'x'. The contrast made in Plato's and Aristotle's ethics between action in a social-political context and contemplation in isolation, hand in hand with a suggestion by both thinkers that the one who has the transformative experience must return to society and help govern, suggests that order alone is not sufficient to a good society. The juxtaposition of a transformative experience in isolation alongside a prescription that the one who has this experience must return to society suggests that a quality 'x', derived in an experience of a vision of the good, is necessary not only to attain the minimalistic definition of justice given earlier in the Republic but to making society conducive to being a good and not merely orderly place to live. Both of these thinkers leave us, then, with the impression that a vision of the good by some individuals is a conduit of a quality 'x', which when present in the city makes the city conducive to a good life, where 'good' is defined as a quality which enables the individual person to attain his function as a human being simply.  In Plato's Allegory especially there is the intimation that a vision of the good by a single individual is a prerequisite to the society as a whole being a place in which one can live well, or that is, virtuously. Virtue, we recall, means for the Greeks 'that quality which when attained enables the entity, here the human person, to attain his natural purpose.

The above analysis of the change in the relationship of the individual who has a transformative experience to the city points to a paradox. Although it seems that society needs some of its individuals to experience a vision of the good, when they do experience such a vision, their relation to the city becomes one of tension. A morally transformative experience of some individuals is necessary to make the society as a whole a good place to live, but when an individual does have such an experience, he will tend to not want to be actively involved with the public life of the society. Put simply, philosophizing does not seem to be conducive to meeting the mundane needs of the city. Plato in particular is highlighting a dilemma which comes out of this tension, for the reason that the content of a vision of the good derived in philosophy is essential not only to the good of the individual who has it, but necessary to the good of society as a whole. In the following section, I turn away from the issue of the good and back towards justice conceived as a fallback position, or in Aristotle's language, a "second best". 13

MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The tension between the moral good and the external political good of order, necessary but not sufficient for the well being of society, once again comes to the surface as an issue in modem political thought. The modem political philosophers are distinguished by their attempt to bring philosophy to bear on the shape of governing institutions. In the process of applying philosophy to the political realm, they attempted to reconcile the above tension by articulating a notion of the good for the single individual which when pursued results in external order. The good for the single individual which they articulated derives in a notion of self-interest. This notion of self interest is in turn based on a particular conception of human nature, namely, that view which holds that human beings are animated primarily by a desire to secure their own material well being and fear of chaos.14

What is noteworthy in the reconciliation of these two goods in the framework of modem political philosophy is that external material well being is taken to be synonymous with the good for man as man. Material well being comes to be conceived to be the highest good, and this good is to be the natural end of all rational individuals. This new account of the highest good, then, turns away from a notion of the good conceived as a final end and towards one grounded in efficient causes based in observable traits of human beings, such as the desire for self-preservation and material comfort.

In defining the good for the single individual as the pursuit of security and material well being, the modems were concerned above all else with attaining the necessary conditions of an ordered and prosperous society. They were not concerned with the highest ends of a good life as understood by the Greeks and Mediaeval thinkers, that is, with virtue. In terms of Plato's Republic, the modems can be shown as accepting what I called above the minimalistic definition of justice as the minding of one's own business and doing one's job well. But they did not think visions of the good were necessary to a good life as redefined in terms of social and political stability, and in fact saw them as disruptive to the political goal of order.

In response to the situation we are faced with today, with Rousseau and Kant we may reasonably ask whether a society predicated on the reconciliation of the tension between the two kinds of goods discussed above pays adequate attention to final ends, the basis of a good life for the Greeks and Mediaeval Christian philosophers. The good life by definition is realized by pursuing both the necessary and sufficient conditions of life, and not merely its necessary conditions.

ROUSSEAU

Rousseau was one of the first to provocatively argue that the modem political project has a cost. Rousseau brought back to our awareness questions which were so central to the ancients. How are we to live a good life? In Rousseau's view, modem society tends to suppress the inner life of the individual as a result of its emphasis on externally defined goods such as money, the opinion of others, or the imperative of social order. In a way which evokes Plato's move from the discussion of justice to the Idea ofthe good, Rousseau suggests that while modern western society is based on the idea that everyone should mind their own business and do their job well, the ensuing state of affairs is lacking in something important. We may gain insight into our contemporary problem by asking about why Plato makes the move he does from the discussion of justice to the discussion of the Idea of the good. Is our own understanding of what is essential to human life both public and private reflective of Plato's discussion of the Idea of the good, or is it essentially reflective of the formal definition of justice as order? If the good is defined primarily in terms of order, one way we might gain insight into our dilemma is by looking to Plato's discussion of the Idea of the good, which for Plato is the fulfillment of the discussion of justice.

While Rousseau was one of the first philosophers to criticize the modem political reconciliation of the good of the single individual and the good of society as a whole, I argue in the second half of the paper that Kant responds to its most significant shortcoming in a novel and effective manner. In Kant's ethical and political thought, the tension between the good of the single individual and the good for society as a whole is not overcome, but maintained. On the basis of this tension, Kant's moral and political philosophy together promote a moral good which is experienced inwardly by the single individual and then infused into society as a whole, resulting in a society that is both ordered and good. This framework is both practicable as well as more satisfying from a moral perspective than the Anglo-American model, for the reason that is does more to promote the highest ends of a good life while also paying heed to its external needs.

PART II

KANT ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL GOOD

Kant tells us that if we want to attain a good life, we are not to make desire for our own happiness the basis of our actions, and at the outset of the Groundwork he tells us that morality consists in having a pure incentive.15 A will is pure when it makes the form of the moral law alone its incentive. He says: "A goodwillisnotgoodbecauseofwhatiteffectsoraccomplishes-becauseofitsfitnessforattainingsome proposed end; it is good through its willing alone -that is, good in itself." (GMM, 62) We might read through the Groundwork and conclude that for Kant, one lives a good life by virtue of having a pure incentivealone. If this were so, then the single individual could experience the highest good in isolation. He would have no need of other people. Having a pure incentive is an inner experience, and does not in itself entail the individual acting in society.

Above I argued that Plato and Aristotle do not imply that the single individual attains a good life in isolation. Both follow the account of an individual experiencing a vision of the good by depicting that individual returning to active involvement with society. The highest good being sought by Plato and Aristotle is predicated upon the experience which only the single individual has. While this vision seems in some sense sufficient to the good of the individual who experiences it, in the fmal analysis it must be judged as deficient. To hold that an inner vision of the good is sufficient to a good life would imply that society should break up into its constitutive members, each going his own way to experience such a vision. While a vision of the good is necessary to the good of the individual as well as society as a whole, then, it can not be considered sufficient to the highest good of either. When Plato and Aristotle follow up their discussions of an individual experiencing a vision of the good by portraying them involved in society, they suggest that both the good experienced inwardly and an external good which comes from taking care of practical affairs are essential to the good they are seeking.

How does this complex relation between the moral and political goods discussed in the first half of the paper show up in Kant's thought? In Book III of the Groundwork, Kant gives a brief overview of how the individual experiences morality. There, he stresses that humans have both reason and inclinations. He argues that we are able to conceive ourselves as beings who are in one respect free and another respect determined by our inclinations. In contrast to Hobbes and Locke, for whom man is a being characterized primarily by fears and desires and motivated by a material definition of happiness, Kant conceives of man as a being who is animated by both empirical conditions as well as an Idea of the good derived in reason. For Kant, we are not animated by instinct or desire alone, nor do we experience the good abstracted from our human condition.

The fact that we have both reason as well as inclinations is essential to Kant's conception of moral experience. Ifwe only had desire, we would live like an animal, basing our actions on instincts. We would be wholly conditioned by external objects. On the other hand, if we only had reason we would exist in the manner of a robot, completely determined by a law given to us, with no choice of whether or not to adhere to it. In either case, we would not be free and we would not experience obligation. Of this, Kant says:

"Hence, if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would be in perfect conformity with the principle of the autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the sensible world, they would have to be taken as in complete conformity with the law of nature i . governing desires and inclinations -that is, with the heteronomy of nature." (GMM,121)

For Kant, it is because we are beings with both reason and inclinations that we can experience moral goodness. Elaborating, he argues that because we have both reason and inclinations, we are able to tell ourselves what we ought to do: "... if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will; but because I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world, they ouJilitso to accord."(GMM,121)

While Kant begins the Groundwork by focusing on the inner ground of moral experience of the individual, namely the pure will, he later indicates that external objects of everyday practical affairs are also important. When he begins to discuss the fact that we also exist in a social context, he reveals something about the nature of the phenomenal context in which the single individual experiences moral goodness. Human beings do not experience morality by simply having a pure will; by living as if we were a disembodied spirit, but by striving after a good or goods in the context of the phenomenal world. In this context, we are motivated both by ideas of the good as well as inclinations and desires. Mental or spiritual qualities as well as physical ones are part of human existence, and we experience both in the mode of continual striving. At our best, we strive after ends which meet our needs and desires as beings who share in both the intelligible and sensible worlds, and we do this in a social context.

In contrast to the modern political philosophers who articulated a political philosophy in which desire and fear are the grounds of the political good of order, Kant articulates a structure in which the political good of order is an effect of actions of single individuals acting on the basis of the moral law. These individuals are animated not solely or even primarily by desire and fear of disorder, but by a vision of the good derived in pure reason. Insofar as Kant grounds the external condition of society on the internal moral incentive of free wills, he re-envisions the relation between the two qualitatively different kinds of goods central to Plato's and Aristotle's ethics. Plato and Aristotle left us with a question about the relation between the good for the individual and the society as a:whole. One of the generally unnoticed accomplishments of Kant's thought is the fact that it offers a response to this ambiguity so salient in Plato's and Aristotle's thought. Whereas Plato and Aristotle leave us with an ambiguity concerning the relation between the good individual and a good society, Kant links the good for society as a whole to an experience of moral goodness in each member of society. In Kant's thought, when the single individual strives after a vision of the good in asocialcontext,heexperiencesbothan innergoodwhileatthe sametimecontributingtotheexternalgood of order in the effects of these actions. This is in sharp contrast to the structure envisioned by the modern political philosophers, in which desire and the fear of disorder are the grounds of the external good of order. While the modern framework is successful in attaining the external conditions of order, it pays no attention to the inner condition of the individual members of society. Kant pays close attention to both goods.

THE HIGHEST GOOD

In the Critique of Practical Reason and the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant threshes out the relationship between the moral and the political good for society as a whole in much more detail. The moral good is derived in free will which adheres to the moral law, and the external political good in the form of a unified society characterized by order is constituted in the object. or effects of the actions of this free will. Both of these goods show up in the discussion of the highest good in the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant defines the highest good in terms of two elements. The first element of the highest good is the good will itself. The second is an object after which the good will strives. In defining the highest good, Kant refers to the ground of the will as an unconditioned condition, saying: "The "highest" can mean the "supreme" (supremum) or the "perfect" (consummatum). The former is the unconditioned condition, i.e. the condition which is subordinate to no other..." 16.He then describes the second element of the highest good as an object which is in the form of a whole, telling us that: ''the [perfect good] is that whole which is no part of a yet larger whole of the same kind..."(CPrR, 114) In sum, the first element of the highest good, the unconditioned condition, is the good will itself. I conceive of this as the locus of the (inner) experience of moral goodness. The perfect good is the object after which the good will strives, and while Kant does not do so here, he eventually entitles this object the Kingdom of God on Earth.

Contrary to the first impression we may have in reading the Groundwork, then, Kant does not argue that we attain the highest good by merely having a pure incentive in isolation from society. He portrays the good will acting in a social context. While the good will is the locus of the experience of the moral good for the single individual, the object of that will, as the Kingdom of God on earth, is equally important to Kant's overall system.

Many of Kant's readers in the English speaking world criticize him for overly abstracting from the way human beings actually live. Anglo-American political philosophy seems to many thoughtful people to be reflective of the way human beings actually are insofar as it acknowledges a desire for happiness defined by external well being. When we look more closely at Kant's political and ethical thought, however, we see that material well being plays a role in it. Kant argues that it is necessary to conceive the possibility of our material well being as an element of the highest good. In striving after the Kingdom of God on Earth, it is possible that we will attain our own material happiness. Continuing from the above remark, he tells us that happiness must be included as a possible object of the good will:

"That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable and thus of all our pursuits of happiness and, consequently, that it is the supreme good have been proved in the Analytic. But these truths do not imply that virtue is the entire and perfect good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required" (CPrR, 114)

In fleshing out the nature of the highest good, then, Kant speaks of two kinds of goods, virtue and happiness in proportion to virtue. He says: "Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in exact proportion to morality... constitutes that of a possible world, the highest good means the whole, the perfect good, wherein virtue is always the supreme good, being the condition having no condition superior to it, while happiness, though something always pleasant to him who possesses it, is not of itself absolutely good in every respect, but always presupposes conduct in accord with the moral law as its condition." (CPrR, 115)

In summary, although the emphasis in Kant's ethics is on the purity of the will, Kant does not argue that our good consists merely in a certain inner state of soul. The good will should contribute to the goodof society as a whole and this society includes individuals who are happy with their external conditions. The good will is to strive to realize the Kingdom of God on earth, the latter instantiated externally as a political- social entity. This kingdom entails both the external political good of order as well as its members acting on the basis of right reasons.

The manner in which Kant conceives what I have been calling the moral and political goods in relation to each other is significant. Both one's own material happiness in addition to the well being of society as a whole is conceived by Kant to be conditional upon the purity of the free wills of individuals. Stated another way, one's own happiness and the well being of society is conceived to be an effect of individuals in the society having a certain inner condition of soul. Importantly, this is in contrast to the structure envisioned by the modern political philosophers who most influenced American sensibilities concerning the good, and for whom one's happiness as well as the political good of order is grounded primarily in empirical conditions. For Hobbes and Locke, the external political good of order is a result of individuals pursuing a material conception of happiness and avoiding chaos. In contrast, for Kant the moral good of the single individual is grounded in the moral law. By virtue of having right reasons for one's actions, one experiences a moral good inwardly and at the same time infuses the social realm with a moral quality. In addition, he contributes to external order. In short, the individual who lives on the basis of a good will experiences inner moral goodness while contributing to both the external political good of order and a moral quality 'x' which transcends order.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that modern English-language political philosophy has left us with a vision of the good which is continuing to flesh itself out. Tentatively, it is reasonable to argue that the reconciliation of the good for the single individual and the political good of order results in a conception of the good which is often misconceived to be a good for the single individual. The modems were primarily concerned with ~ creating the sufficient conditions of the external political good of order, however, and not attain the highest ends of a good life. Most moral philosophers have argued that a moral or inner quality is a necessary component of a good life. The modern notion of happiness, which is largely empirical in conception and ~licitly based on the idea that man is primarily characterized by inclinations and fear of disorder, leads to a society which has order and prosperity, but pays little attention to promoting the moral good as a necessary :gredient in a good life.

The uniqueness of Kant's philosophy lies in the fact that when internalized by the concrete individuals who make up society, it results in their experiencing a good which is moral in essence and grounded in inner experience. At the same time, this inner experience directly contribute to the external political good of order and infuses society with a moral quality transcending the good of order. Right reasons are at the center of Kant's ethical vision which reconciles the tension between the good for the single individual and the good for society as a whole in a way which enhances both. By acting on the basis of right reasons, I contribute to my own good as a single individual as well as the good of society. Kant's ethical and political thought together gives us a possible way of moving closer to the goal of all moral and political philosophy. It creates the conditions of the possibility of the attainment of both the necessary and sufficient conditions of a good life.

ENDNOTES

I .I have found talking to those ftom formerly Communist eastern Europe fruitful in helping me.

2 Since we do not attain the highest ends of existence once and for all, it is more fitting to speak of the moral good as that which contributes to striving after these ends. For example, if a highest end of existence is courage, then the moral good is that which enables a person to become more courageous.

3 Discussingwhetherthe excellenceof a good man and a good citizen is the same or not, in Politics, Bk. III, Ch. 4, Aristotle says: " one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the excellence of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single excellence of the good citizen which is perfect excellence.. But we say that the good man is he who has one single excellence which is perfect excellence. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the excellence which makes a good man." Aristotle, Politics, trans. by J. Barnes, (CambridgeUniv. Press:Cambridge), 1276:15-36.

4 See for example Book A,Ch. 4, 1096b30 and all of Ch. 10, in Nichomachean Ethics. In Bk.B,Chapter I, Aristotlesays:... "none of the ethical virtues arise in us by nature [at birth]... virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but by our nature we can receive them and perfect them by habituation." Furthermore, "In the case of the virtues... we acquire them as a result of prior activities; and this is like the case of the arts, for that which we are to perform by art after learning, we first learn by performing, e.g. we become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre. Similarly, we become just be doing what is just, temperate by doing what is temperate, and brave by doing brave deeds." Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by H. Apostle, (peripatetic Press: Grinell, Iowa), Book A, Ch. 4, 1096b30.

5. In Book K, Chapter 7, Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle says: "Since happiness is an activity according to virtue, it is reasonable that it should be an activity according to the highest virtue; and this would be an activity of the best part of man. So whether this be intellect or something else which is thought to rule and guide us by its nature and to have comprehension of noble and divine objects, being itself divine or else the most divine part in us, its activity according to its proper virtue would be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative has already been mentioned and this would seem to be in agreement both with our previous remarks, and with the truth."

6 The majority of Aristotle commentators argue that the move to the discussion of contemplation in Bk.K flows naturally from Aristotle's stress on practical action in the prior nine books of the Nichomachean Ethics. I would argue that Aristotle's dialectical discussion of both contemplation and practical action in Bk. K in particular suggests a more esoteric reading, about which a hint may be given in the reference to a "second best" at the end ofBk. B, I I09a39. While the position that there is no inconsistency in the switch in focus nom practical action to contemplation is reasonable, as Aristotle does allude earlier to the fact that he will later speak of contemplation, I would argue that it is not reasonable to argue that there is no ambiguity in Aristotle's view of the relative importance of action and contemplation to the good life.

7 In Republic, Book IV, 433a8, in speaking about justice at the end of a long discussion, Plato says: "Surely we set down and often said, if you remember, that each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit." And: "... justice is the minding of one's own business and not being a busybody, this we have heard from many others and have often said ourselves." Plato, Republic, trans. by Alan Bloom, (Basic Books: New York, NY).

8 See Republic 368e2, 434d and 44ld in particular, as well as the entire discussion between 427c and 445b. See Note II below.

9 See Republic, Book I, 351c5, where Plato discusses the need for order among thieves. The fact that Plato speaks of bad men adhering to a minimal standard of order to attain their goals subtly suggests that something more is required than justice, the latter defined primarily in terms of an ordered relation of the parts into a unified whole. Plato's twice refers to the need for a "longer route around" at 435d and 504b, this longer route being the discussion of the Idea of the Good, the missing element up to this point in the discussion.

10See Republic, Book V, following the Allegory, 517c I0 through 521 c.

11 As seen in the text mentioned in Note 8, throughout the Republic, Plato speaks of justice in the individual and justice in the city, portraying them as if they were identical. At434c in speaking of the discussion of justice in the city, he says: "But if this form is applied to human being singly and also agreed by us to be justice there,then we'll concede it... And if not, we'll consider something else." In this reference in particular, he makes room for the possibility that they are not identical. The last sentence cited most likely refers to the longer route around mentioned in Footnote 9.

12 See Book K, Nicomachean Ethics, Chs. 8-10. At the beginning of Ch. 9, for example, Aristotle says: "Being human, however,a man will need external resources also; for his nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation but he needs a healthy body and nourishment and other resources." 1178b34.

13 We can summarize the problem briefly as follows: Philosophy is necessary to the moral good of the individual and the city. But both need order and material well being as well. The tension shows up as a need to emphasize the attainment of a moral and spiritual good more or less relative to material well being and order. When either one of these goods is made primary, the other is to some extent made more difficult to attain. Not only does the pursuit of one not entail the attainment of the other, but it seemst o "deflate" the other.

14This is a primary theme of Hobbes's Leviathan.

15 ImmanuelKant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H.J. Paton, (NewYork,NY: HarperTorch~ (948), p. 62.

16Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck, (New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill Company, (956), p. 115