We might think of the ‘holy grail' of political philosophy as the combination
of the good for the human being as such with the good of society as a whole.
At times I have referred to these two goods as the 'deep good' and the 'political
good.' One way to think about certain philosophical problems for us as moderns
is by looking at how these two qualitatively distinct goods are defined by
the founders of modern political philosophy. While thinking about how
these distinct goods are defined, we are to keep in mind that, to a great
extent, the moderns get their material from pre-modern and especially Greek
philosophy. If there is a dilemma in modernity of a moral-spiritual nature,
one way we might get a better grasp of it is by looking closely at the way
the above distinction was understood and what the point of making it is. The
best way into this distinction is via
Aristotle's distinction between the good man and the good citizen.
Isn't it clear that many men would choose to do, possess and enjoy the reputation
for things that are opined to be just and fair, even if they are not, while
when it comes to the good, no one is satisfied with what is opined to be so,
but each seeks the things that are, and from here on out everyone despises
the opinion? ... Now this is what every soul pursues for the sake of which
it does everything...
from The Republic, Book VI, 505d
Leo Strauss on the distinction
The practical meaning of the notion of the best regime appears most clearly,
when one considers the ambiguity of the term "good citizen". Aristotle
suggests two entirely different definitions of the good citizen. In his more
popular Constitution of Athens he suggests that the good citizen
is a man who serves his country well, without any regard to the difference
of regimes - who serves his country well in fundamental indifference to the
change of regimes. The good citizen, in a word, is the patriotic citizen,
the man whose loyalty belongs first and last to his fatherland. In his less
popular Politics, Aristotle says that there is not the good
citizen without qualification. For what it means to be a good citizen depends
entirely on the regime. A good citizen in Hitler's Germany would be a bad
citizen elsewhere. But wheras 'good citizen' is relative to the regime, 'good
man' does not have such relativity. The meaning of good man is always and
everwhere the same. The good man is identical with the good citizen only in
one case - the case of the best regime. For only in the best regime is the
good of the regime and the good of the good man identical
- that goal being virtue. This amounts to saying that in his Politics, Aristotle
questions the proposition that patriotism is enough. From the point of view
of the patriot, the fatherland is more important than any difference of regime.
From the point of view of the patriot, he who prefers any regime to the fatherland
is a partisan, if not a traitor. Aristotle says in effect that the partisan
sees deeper than the patriot, but that only one kind of partisan is superior
to the patriot; this is the partisan of virtue. One can express Aristotle's
thought as follows: patriotism is not enough for the same reason that the
most doting mother is happier if her child is good than if he is bad. A mother
loves her child because he is her own; she loves what is her own. But she
also loves the good. All human love is subject to the law that it be both
love of one's own and love of the good, and there is necessarily a tension
between love of one's own and the good, a tension which may well lead to a
break, be it only the breaking of a heart.
Leo Strauss, from What is Political Philosophy,
p. 35
Text
from Aristotle's Politics