Names are in regular font when signing off, and in bold for salutation.

4/19/07

Sean,

I meant to say that animals can't be reflective; they cannot think about thinking.   Ultimately, philosophizing means to be self reflective. What I'm interested concerning those who focus heavily on animals is the 'gut motives' for a significant percentage of thoughtful individuals in a culture to even want to argue that animals are not different from humans. If one were a materialist - e.g. if they held that only the physical realm is real or operative - then I could see why they might have a scientific reason for arguing this route. But otherwise, I think it is a sign of a decline of a culture that statistically many otherwise thoughtful individuals would be motivated subjectively to hold such a view. In other words, the passionate attachment of a particular moral stance to the claim that animals are 'not that different' from humans is itself an issue, and in fact more interesting anthropologically than whether the claims are in any sense true or not. The objective rightness or wrongness then is not so interesting to me - and I think that issue is meaningless practically. What matters is the reasons for being attracted to the view.

It's been nice and cool here!

Terry

 

Hi Terry, Interesting. Yes, you have given me that impression or notion.

Frankly, I am not convinced that humans are self-reflective. I don't mean to be glib. I do, however, mean to point out that surely reflection is a matter of degree, and not an ontological category. The latter is the traditional Western understanding, which I think you accept.

"They aren't self reflective" is a doctrinal principle. It is not a principle applied to humans - which are animals, as we know, to the consternation of some - because humans are imbued with "souls." According to the doctrine, the soul gives the animal the power of self reflection. (Or is it otherwise, a mythological structure granting a "breath of life" followed by the "knowledge of good and evil"?) As an aside, we note that this doctrine of a soul is unable to explain why brain damage in humans can destroy the power of self-reflection.

Despite their disputes over the centuries, scholastic humanists and secular humanists do agree on reifying the idea of man. Given the drift of your response, it occurs to me that this idea frequently remains dominant as a center point of the universe - just as once a previous culture believed that the sun orbited the earth. The defenders of that particular culture intended to prevent its decline. One of their last defenses might have been that the objective truth of the solar system was "meaningless practically," but I doubt we would agree that this is the case. Emotion seems to be the only motivation for clinging to this response.

Rather than looking at scientific investigation as a decline of culture, the stronger argument is that a willingness to pursue new knowledge represents a willingness to renew that which has been moribund. Such willingness lies at the heart of healthy motivation.

Sean

 

4/20/07

Sean

By "thinking about thinking" I mean that one can stand back and reflect on their own thoughts. I am not saying this is the highest form of existing for human beings - but that it is one way of distinguishing between man and animals. I'm also not making this statement as a "principle", which I take to mean referring to something like a Platonized "essence" apart from a way of living or a way of being and becoming. Rather, I mean to base it on observation of behavior.

I thought this remark of yours was interesting -

"The defenders of that particular culture intended to prevent its decline. One of their last defenses might have been that the objective truth of the solar system was "meaningless practically," but I doubt we would agree that this is the case. Emotion seems to be the only motivation for clinging to this response."

I don't think most people who argue this line of thought are detached in the way you are. They strike me as nihilists. It is fair to say that in the history of humanity, it is only in the West that we see the development of lines of thought which seem to be self-negating. When I say "self-negating" I mean collectively. And I base it on some standards. It is not rational to argue that animals are only different as a matter of degree from humans, and this argument is much more clearly motivated by emotion than my stand, which is much easier to defend on the basis of reason and a whole tradition.

Terry

4/21/07

Terry

In regards to your meta-thinking objection, I didn't read anyone as making that claim. (How would one prove such a claim anyway?) So the objection strikes me as a straw-man argument.

You wrote: "It is fair to say that in the history of humanity, it is only in the West that we see the development of lines of thought which seem to be self-negating. When I say "self-negating" I mean collectively."

This is a hell of a generalization to draw, without even consulting the traditions of India, where the art of subtle and sophisticated self-negation has been practiced for thousands of years. Without going into it, there seems to be a thread from Hindu thought through the 19th century European translations of India's holy books, to the Western disease that concerns you so much. It continues, for example, in "New Age" thinking in the United States. (I need to wonder in passing, what do you mean, anyway, by "self" and "collectively" in this context? If two brothers have an argument - never mind two strangers - have the brothers self-negated themselves?)

You write: "It is not rational to argue that animals are only different as a matter of degree from humans. This argument seems clearly motivated by emotion in a way that the traditional stance is not. The claim I'm making - that animals are essentially diffferent from man and that this difference regards their inability to be self-reflective - is much easier to defend on the basis of reason and a whole tradition."

I would be interested in distinguishing between "rational" and "reasonable." This is a very problematic area. We come to different conclusions when we begin from different bases of fact.

That humans are ontologically different from all other animals is essentially a religious claim. I think we can both be comfortable with that idea. It is also a religious claim that angels occupy a distinct category, as do devils or demons. We may as well say that fire is ontologically distinct from earth, wind, and water, and that it is "irrational" to regard any one of these substances as occupying a continuum with regard to another, or that it is "irrational" to assert another way of conceptualizing the nature of existence - the periodic table of the elements, for instance - which is based on a different manner of inquiry.

The fact that a non-human animal can recognize itself in a mirror should not threaten a philosopher or a culture. Is a culture really that brittle? But I don't read your critique that way. Rather, what seems disturbing is that fact that this triggers a comparison by the journalist, that the chimpanzee, or dolphin, or elephant, is "like us." We may not recognize a community with other life.

"Like us" offends the traditional structure of, "God is Great, Man is (capable of being) Good, followed by the lesser spheres of existence: animals are automatons (and therefore amoral), vegetables are animate yet immobile - ? - & insensate - ? - and the mineral sphere is the pivot upon which the theater of Good and Evil plays out. (I recognize the descendants of this medieval Type-A cosmological architecture in modern jurisprudence.)

Since the presumed purpose of existence is moral theater, any amoral inquiry into the nature of existence can be seen as philosophically offensive, and symptomatic of moral corruption. This gives rise to a new type of theater, medieval v. modern, played out in the academies. Characterizing the preceding framework as medieval is justified insofar as its reasoning is circular: our tradition is correct because it is the tradition; it alone is the basis for an ontological claim.

More grist for the mill: I saw Prof. de Waal speak last fall, and it was fascinating. Among other topics, he has researched the social rules governing the behavior of chimpanzees. I expect you would find this

http://www.emory.edu/LIVING_LINKS/OurInnerApe/book.html

to be very disturbing. I think this is ironic, because otherwise you might find an ally in this scientist.

Sean

8/20/07

To E-list:

I've been fascinated with the issue of Jansenism since being influenced by Jesuits and their friends at Loyola. Given an interest in what I take to be the largely harmful influence of Jansenism on Irish-American Catholics in particular, the joke, originally with cartoon, resonated for me. Someone I met at a monastery in NM in the time after the storm sent it to me. I can't copy the pictures, hence the blanks. FYI: Jansenism is the Catholic version of Calvinism, and judged a heresy by the Church. It still lingers pretty heavily, however, in some quarters, like a bad stench...! The main symptom of Jansenism is a vague misanthropy and the projection of the message "you are guilty because you are". This movement came to the US in force in the 20th century via France and Ireland. (google "Jansenism and Jesuits" or just "jansenism" to get some insight into the issue. See the French film "Babette's Feast" for a nice illustration of the contrasting psychologies.)

Here's the cartoon/joke

Terry

*A young monk arrives at the monastery. He is assigned to helping the other monks in copying the old canons and laws of the church by hand**.*

*He notices, however, that all of the monks are copying from copies, not from the original manuscript. So, the new monk goes to the head abbot to question this, pointing out that if someone made even a small error in the first copy, it would never be picked up! In fact, that error would be continued in all of the subsequent copies.*

*The head monk, says, "We have been copying from the copies for centuries, but you make a good point, my son."** *

*He goes down into the dark caves underneath the monastery** **where the original manuscripts are held as archives in a locked vault that hasn't been opened for hundreds of years.** * *Hours go **by and nobody sees the old abbot . . .** *

*So, the young monk gets worried and goes down to look for him. He sees him banging his head against the wall and wailing.** * *"We missed the **_R_** ! We missed the **_R_** **! * *We missed the **_R_** **!"** * *His forehead is all bloody and bruised and he is crying** **uncontrollably. The young monk asks the old abbot, "What's wrong, father?"** * *With A choking voice, the old abbot replies, "The word was...*

*"CELEB**R**ATE **!!!**"*

9/29/07

Sean,

I wanted to show you these remarks on Hitchen's book on religion. They were sent to me by a Jesuit novice.

Terry.

http://creedalchristian.blogspot.com/2007/09/hitchens-book-is-not-great.html

 

Terry

Just a few quick thoughts on the anti-Hitchens book review.

The opening paragraph sets up a straw man in the place of H, and the review follows that to the end. The first half avoids wrestling with H's ideas, and instead merely presents his "outlandish" arguments to the reader in the expectation that the reader agrees with the worldview of the reviewer. I thought I was reading a screed.

The reviewer then seems to believe he scores his biggest points by nitpicking over H's factual errors, forming the conclusion that H's entire argument is consequently misguided. That was a leap since the reviewer pointedly ignores the main thrust of H's arguments, that fundamentalists are bad (in three words).

The review only became interesting for me at the end, when the reviewer basically said, hey, don't paint us intelligent Christians with the same brush you apply to the ignorant and violent rabble rousers we all should discourage. A more interesting review would have been a defense of religion's non-verifiable claims, as they create "good," but that would have served no purpose for the book reviewer's readership. It would be preaching to the choir.

By that same token, the reviewer's criticism of H's book, that they contained factual errors, misses the point, since the book is not an academic work, but rather a polemic in defense of secular society. We expect polemicists to be occasionally bombastic. Al Franken's books are good examples of that. That such books ignore the rigor and insights of academia should not surprise us, in light of the ivory-tower syndrome (where aloof intellectuals avoid the bustle of the marketplace, effectively keeping their footnotes to themselves).

Finally, it is wrong to label H a "militant atheist," since he does not advocate violence. In fact, he primarily argues against violence, and especially deplores religions that fail to do so.

I don't suppose you have read H's book, or any of H's articles, or observed his debates with Christian apologists? How about the Jesuit novice you mentioned in your e-mail? How disappointing it would be if this book review remains an exercise in hitting-the-pinata . So, for your perusal:

http://www.slate.com/id/2165033/entry/2165035/

Please feel free to forward my critique of the criticism to whomever you like.

Sean

P.S. A final note: the reviewer goes to extremes in nitpicking when, for example, he faults H for using the word "solipsist" to mean an obsessive egocentrist. If the reviewer were a better pedant, he would know that it is in fact a correct use of the word.

 

Terry

When I read your criticisms, I find myself paying very close attention in order to extract the gist of your message. Sometimes I find it elusive. In an effort to check my work, I ask you if this a fair approximation (in 50 words or less):

Man needs spirituality. Spirituality is not accessed by reason. The more recent history of Western philosophy puts too much emphasis on reason, and as a consequence "modern" people find their lives impoverished. The ideas of relativism that have invaded our discussions of morality have contributed to this impoverishment.

Me: I understand that your views may be more nuanced, and that much of the debate involves readings and misreadings of history.

Another question (at least rhetorical): How do you respond to Hitchens here (below)?

"We [atheists] are not immune to the lure of wonder and mystery and awe: we have music and art and literature, and find that the serious ethical dilemmas are better handled by Shakespeare and Tolstoy and Schiller and Dostoyevsky and George Eliot than in the mythical morality tales of the holy books. Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind and—since there is no other metaphor—also the soul."

Sean

Sean:

Yes - I think that is a good summary. When I wrote that post, I did not guide all my remarks by the specific issue at hand, but used the occasion to bring up other more general issues that are relevant to it in a more general way. The quote you have: "We [atheists] are not immune to the lure of wonder and mystery and awe: we have music and art and literature, and find that the serious ethical dilemmas are better handled by Shakespeare and Tolstoy and Schiller and Dostoyevsky and George Eliot than in the mythical morality tales of the holy books. Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind..."

Yes - I thought you or he covered one of the bases of concern I would have.

One remark would be that "scripture" isn't analagous to literature in that the former isn't a form of revelation nor is it intended to be, at least for the most part. I think the two articles I showed you when I lived in my apart. by Eric Voegelin - one called "Reason: The Classic Experience" and the other "THe Gospel and Culture" best get at the themes I'm trying to convey - in a relatively concentrated fashion. You might google "Voegelin Plato man metaxy" - here, I did it below. See second paragraph in particular

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaxy This is a post to wik. - perhaps the weakest one Ive seen - but it gets at something about the concept of "metaxy". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Waltzzz/Metaxy http://www.jstor.org/view/00222801/di957295/95p00147/0 Voegelin terminology: ' http://home.salamander.com/~wmcclain/ev-glossary.html

 

Terry:

I look forward to having the leisure to read those thinkers who have most influenced you. Regarding the specific issue at hand and your recent response, I find it very intriguing to imagine areas of conceptual overlap that you and Hitchens may share. I know that you would not identify as an atheist, and Hitchens would not identify as Catholic, nevertheless. . .

Scripture? Literature? Poetry? Clearly one way of crystallizing the issue is whether we regard revelation as having an upper case R, or a lower case one - and when.

Unfortunately, those who assert a privileged revelation do so on the basis of their location. Here is an irony. Advocates of the especial holiness of one scripture (against another), usually appeal to some reasoned objectivity. However, if we employ an objective test on these claims, we must admit as holy scripture all those texts that are revered by groups that have a reasonable size and age. But the parochial bias inherent in we believers causes us to reject this observation out-of-hand. It must be banished from the mind. It must be some kind of threat.

Another unfortunate result of believing in revelation with a capital R is that it generates a vast remainder; it denigrates one's experience in an otherwise wealthy cosmos. (I suppose the only Christians I am at war with are those who hate Creation.)

How about a subjective test? I was once critiqued for reading too much nonfiction! My critic said to me that I must read more [quality] fiction, so I may be exposed to new ways of seeing. This was very good advice, I have found. Revelation in fiction? As a way of seeing? The Gospel of Thomas teaches that one may find God under every stone.

Sean

 

new thread

9/30/07

Sean,

Regarding the notion that people on the "pro" side of religion" (or Socratic understanding of reason) should read these books, the problem is that the ones I�ve read usually reveal a misunderstanding of what true religion is about. (I say "true" because any thoughtful person who describes themselves as religious will separate the political aspects of the religion as an institution from any substantive moral and spiritual claims of the same) The reason that this happens, especially in English speaking countries, I suspect, is because there is a tendency for our most educated types to be "biased" towards the modern conception of reason. The modern conception of reason is, in the eyes of the types who are anti-"religion", is the only valid way of accessing reality. (I noted that in the link on Slate it is suggested that these types be called " brights". That is interestingly close to my sense of these individuals - who seem very optimistic about reason alone to "access" the true and good. They also seem to rely on a high level of intellectual ability. Any conception of the universe which requires that we all be highly intellectual to live well seems fundamentally untrue.) The problem with the modern conception of reason, which I usually find implicit in what is a general mind set of those inclined towards atheism, is that when these individuals assume that the modern understanding of reason - e.g. scientific, utilitarian reason, these individuals go against their own felt relativism - their own "sense" that all truth claims are in some sense projections of the time and place and in that sense "limited". I explain my point below. A lot of this tendency in our culture to assume modern reason as a basic platform for viewing life and reality comes out of British moral philosophy over the last 400 years. My feeling, quite frankly, is that British moral philosophy is some of the more shallow philosophy to come out of Western civilization, and has bequeated to us such moralities as utilitarianism - the notion that the good is defined by "more individuals getting more material wealth" and the notion that morality is based on sense and feeling alone. It has also given us the Lockean notion that all human beings have reason and that this reason is the ground of their goodness. This claim seems patently shallow and untrue. I think that American atheists are often a "showing up" of John Locke, who hid his own practical atheism from view for obvious reasons. His spirit is with us though. In short, there is not much sense in British moral thought for the transcendent and for obvious reasons the thinkers who gave us modern political philosophy were wary of religion. Rightly so. Religion was then conflated with political institutions, and religion had declined to being merely another worldly power. This was an empirical event in the historical development of the West and especially English speaking countries. But this empirical event in the development of institutional religion does not tell us anything about the truth claims of the original moral and spiritual claims of the religion. It only tells us something about these institutions and the individuals that made them up at that time. Now if religion remained mostly political, then we�d have a basis of critique of "religion", but there is no reason to claim this, as is witnessed by all the tension in Western Christianity since the reformation over precisely this issue. Many struggle against institutionalism precisely because they are oriented to a moral and spiritual truth.

Of course, western European existentialism of which peaked a while ago is notoriously antagonistic towards any claims about truth or the good. Their spirit seems to recommend a conscious if not enthusiastic embrace of our inability to know any good or true moral or spiritual object(s) of striving. But here too it just seems to me like the (modern) SPIRIT of Descartes and the scientific revolution has "infected" their spirit - has "eviscerated" them of any sense for a transcendent moral/spiritual object of striving. It�s as if they have "internalized" the implicit agnosticism of modern philosophy in general and at times attempt to transform this into a moral ideal. They�ve moved from holding a claim descriptively to holding it as a kind of anti-morality. I don�t claim that these individuals are bad, and agree that many times the more balanced among them are in fact more moral than many self-described "religious" individuals.

But back briefly to the mention of the specifically Anglo-American mind-set. Combined with the modern scientific revolution and Cartesianism, the SPIRIT of Anglo speakers who "internalize" these views seems to me to be likely to be strongly agnostic or atheistic. These individuals also contradict their own felt relativism in another much more subtle way: The fact of the matter is that the truth of human existence, whether accessed by Socratic (not modern or Anglo-American) reason or Christian revelation, is NOT "absolute" in the manner in which the English speakers I am thinking of above often assume those who are pro-religion/revelation) think it is. To say that there is a real moral/spiritual object of human striving which is not "accessible" by (modern) reason - e.g. knowledge - and which exists in some real way - the form of this existence only amorphously "felt" through intuition and "verified" by a community of many individuals with similar "felt" intuitions or what I call "insights" ("revelations") is also to say that reason as secular westerns think of it today is not exhaustive as a mode of "accessing" what is or what should be. Patterns of recounted experience count, after all. The repeated accounting of the experience of a kind of truth (e.g. a "presence of God") which is not "accessed" by modern reason is somewhat analogous to the repeated accounting of being homosexual by many single individuals today. As I�ve said elsewhere, when many many such accounts are given, they cannot be dismissed as "crazy" or "out of reality" or "made up". To dismiss such accounts is to say that experience ought not inform us of the ground of human existence - of what is or what ought to be; of the scientific beginnings or "grounds" or the moral/spiritual ends. To dismiss such accounts is to assume that the Cartesian spirit is the peak of philosophy - when it is better understood as a useful method for clarifying ones thoughts.

Related to my point that many atheists assume that those who are "pro" religious are "absolutists" about their vision of the good and true, I suspect that they are assuming the Cartesian object of critique - they are assuming that the only form of the truth of human existence is a "Platonic essence" or a metaphysical object. But there is no reason to assume this as the only form of truth, and then because that form is easily criticized, think that there is no truth. In contrast to the Cartesian target - the overly-Platonic notion of truth - the truth of human existence (also?) "shows up" or "reveals itself" in particular contexts, or that is, particular cultural contexts. It happens to be that one of the context in which this truth does NOT "show up" is, for the most part, the kind of culture in which the modern understanding of reason dominates. To talk about caring for "true religion" then means to also understand and "see" the way the PRE moderns "accessed" reality, both immanent and transcendent - whether through Socratic reason or revelation. Such "seeing" does not entail "absolute truth claims" or Platonism- which is the antipode to the modern conception of reason. Not coincidentally, the modern project has itself an "absolute" conception of truth, in spirit if not content. A goal which comes out of the SPIRIT of the Enlightenment and which is exacerbated by the conflicts arising after the Reformation is that we "prove" that our "position" is "the absolute true one". The need to assert that ones religious views are "absolute" arose as a practical matter mostly as a defense mechanism on the part of both the Catholic Church AND Protestors to "buttress" their positions relative to each other. In other words, claims to be the holders of the "absolute truth" was to a significant extent a rhetorical device, and if one looks at the history of Christianity prior to the reformation they will not see this stress as a part of the earlier tradition, which I take to be more authoritative as a guide. The tendency to focus on "absolute" truth claims is, in my view, another "temptation" we see in English speaking countries, which I note are geographically and culturally isolated. Those who either charge the religious with being "absolutists" or those religious themselves who think that this is their proper stance reveal a misunderstanding of the history of western religions and moral and spiritual thought. To understand that history, one would have to read those who themselves understand the radical change that occurs in the modern Western mind vis a vis the concept of truth and the good - esp. the "utilitarian" concept of reason that has come to dominate educated types in the English speaking world especially; the Cartesian spirit, and finally the atheistic existentialist spirit of Europe in the 60's and 70's. (The dominate conception of truth arising out of this trio of cultural sources is: The only kind of truth that reason can grasp are claims that are in some way verifiable, usually quantifiable, and that do not entail any kind of hierarchy of moral goods. This "neutral" morality can be fruitfully understood as in fact the philosophically questionable application of the scientific understanding of the physical world to an arrangement of the human realm. The problem (for my stance) is that the former does not include a moral or spiritual component, or that is, a concept of a natural or divine telos. As such it cannot provide a robust good for the polity or its members to aim at. This is the fundamental problem on both the far secular left and free market right. ) In short, the "militant atheists" criticized on the relevant blog - http://creedalchristian.blogspot.com/2007/09/hitchens-book-is-not-great.html

do not understand the history of Western religion and philosophy, tending to assume that the DIRECTION of Anglo-American philosophy in the last 400 or so years has "gotten it right". In this view, "truth" is understood as an object of "correct scientific description" as distinguished from a moral /spiritual end of human being which is not accessible by a narrow conception of reason.

Terry
09/30/07

Terry -

I should have remarked on Hitchens' motivation. Much of his animus is directed at the existence of intolerant, fundamentalist Muslims who are nevertheless tolerated in Britain. British secular society allows them to exist, but if these sectarian religious people had their way, they would destroy the secular society that hosts them. This important fact is lost on Hitchens' American critics, as they tend to feel very secure in their traditional separation of church and state (wrongly assuming it to be a foregone conclusion).

An abbreviated broadside at Islam:

http://www.slate.com/id/2165033/entry/2165038/

 

I thought this article was worth including

Terry

Reading this, I was reminded of the Hitchens reviewer who did not seem to understand the context in which Hitchens was writing. It is somewhat surprising that this context is not more central to American theologians in the post-9/11 era. Is my impression mistaken, that they remain primarily concerned with their own aesthetic experience? Do they find an atheist essentially to be a buzz-kill?

By Christopher Hitchens Posted Monday, Oct. 8, 2007, at 11:28 AM ET

If any country has enjoyed a long reputation for peac eful and democratic consensus combined with civic fortitude, that coun try is the Netherlands. It was one of the special countries of the Enlightenment, providing refuge for the family of Baruch Spinoza and for the heterodox Pierre Bayle and René Descartes. It overcame Catholic-Protestant fratricide with a unique form of coexistence, put up a spirited resistance to Nazi occupation, evolved a constitutional form of monarchy, and managed to make a fairly generous settlement with its former colonies and their inhabitants. In the last few years, two episodes have hideously sullied this image. The first smirching was the conduct of the Dutch contingent in Bosnia, who in July 1995 abandoned the population of the U.N.-protected "safe haven" at Srebrenica and enabled the w orst massacre of civilians on European soil since World War II. Dutch officers were photographed hoisting champagne glasses with the sadistic goons of Ratko Mladic's militia before leaving the helpless Muslim population to a fate that anyone could have predicted. Those of us who protested at this slaughter of Europe's Muslims are also obliged to register outrage, I think, at the Dutch state's latest betrayal. On Oct. 1, having leaked its intention in advance to the press, the Christian-Democrat administration of Jan Peter Balkenende announced that it would no longer guarantee the protection of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. To give a brief back story, it will be remembered that Hirsi Ali, a refugee from genital mutilation, forced marriage, and civil war in her native Somalia, was a member of the Dutch parliament. She collaborated with Theo van Gogh on a film—Submission—that highlighted the maltreatment of Muslim immigrant women living in Holland. Van Gogh was mu rdered on an Amsterdam street in November 2004; a note pinned to his b ody with a knife proved to be a threat to make Hirsi Ali the next victim. Placed inside a protective bubble by the authorities, she was later evicted from her home after neighbors complained that she was endangering their safety and then subjected to a crude attempt to deprive her of her citizenship. Resolving not to stay where she was not wanted, Hirsi Ali moved to the United States, where she was offered a place by the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., and where the Dutch government undertook to continue to provide her with security. This promise it no longer finds it convenient to keep. The ostensible reason for the climb-down is the cost, which involves a basic 2 million euros (not very much for a state), which can admittedly sometimes be higher if Hirsi Ali has to travel. The Dutch parliament debates this question later thi s week, and I hope that its embassies hear from people who don't regard this as an "internal affair" of the Netherlands. If a prominent elected politician of a Western country can be left undefended against highly credible threats from Islamist death squads, what price all of our easy babble about not "appeasing terrorists"? Especially disgraceful is the Dutch government's irresponsible decision to announce to these death squads, without even notifying Hirsi Ali, that after a given date she would be unprotected and easy game. (Lest I inadvertently strengthen this deplorable impression, let me swiftly add that at present she is under close guard in the United States.) Suppose the narrow and parochial view prevails in Holland, then I think that we in America should welcome the chance to accept the responsibility ourselves. Ayaan Hirsi Ali has become a symbol of the resistance, by many women from the Muslim world, to gender apartheid, "honor" killing, genital mutilation , and other horrors of clerical repression. She has been a very clear and courageous voice against the ongoing attack on our civilization mounted by exactly the same forces. Her recent memoir, Infidel (which I recommend highly, and to which, I ought to say, I am contributing a preface in its paperback edition), is an account of an extremely arduous journey from something very like chattel slavery to a full mental and intellectual emancipation from theocracy. It is a road that we must, and for our own sake as well, be willing to help others to travel. For a while, her security in America was provided by members of the elite Dutch squad that is responsible for the protection of the Dutch royal family and Dutch politicians. The U.S. government requested that this be discontinued, for the perfectly understandable reason that foreign policemen should not be operating on American soil. The job has now been subcontracted, and was until recently underwritten by The Hague. If The Hague defaults, then does the "war on terror" administration take no interest in protecting the life of one of the finest enemies, and one of the most prominent targets, of the terrorists? Hirsi Ali has been accepted for permanent residence in the United States, and would, I think, like to become a citizen. That's an honor. If she was the CEO of Heineken or the president of Royal Dutch Shell, and was subject to death threats while on U.S. soil, I have the distinct feeling that the forces of law and order would require no prompting to consider her safety a high priority. A last resort would be to set up a trust or fund by voluntary subscription and continue to pay for her security that way. Perhaps some of the readers of this column would consider kicking in or know someone who was about to make an unwise campaign contribution that could be diverted to a better end? If so, do please watch this space and be prepared to write to your congressional representatives, or to the Dutch ambassador, in the meantime. We keep hearing that not enough sacrifices are demanded of us, and many people wonder what they can do to forward the struggle against barbarism and intimidation. So, now's your chance. Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair and the author of God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything.

 

my response

Sean,

Well his topic of discussion here has nothing to do with atheism - I sensed no atheism in the article. My point being that of course most would agree with the tone and content of what he is saying here. But when he argues explicitly against religion simply and/or religious experience - that is another thing altogether. When you mention "esthetic experience", I'm not sure what you mean - if you mean "inner experience of God", that wouldn't be properly understood as an "esthetic experience" - for the latter term refers consciously only to a subjective reaction to an experience of beauty, or something like this. "Religious" or "spiritual" individuals will account that they have experiences of some reality which transcends reason, which in modern usage means is not an empirical reality. While the discusison below is reasonable and clear - and I agree with its tone and content - the book critiquing Mother Teresa is not in the same ball park. His animus against her and/or the Church as her "keeper" is not the same kind of "target" as the fundamentalism. Maybe my specific point is that his target is too big - too wide - ???
Terry

Terry

Fair enough. I didn't mean to imply that he was concerned with atheism in this article. I meant to reference his political arguments in "God Is Not Great."

As for the difference you allege between "aesthetic experience" and "spiritual experience," you have not convinced me. What makes you think the former does not include an experience of reality that "transcends reason"? An experience of reality that transcends reason is clearly a massive category of experience. I imagine that you wish to privilege one "kind" of experience over another. I also imagine that you define "aesthetic" as regarding superficial analysis of appearance. But if appearance includes form and time, can it really be considered superficial? And if the aesthetic mode embraces subjective sensitivity, can it really be accused of being preoccupied with objectivity? You seem to agree that the answer is no. What after all can be divorced from emotion? And if "aesthetic" includes emotion, how does it differ from "spiritual"? You imply that one involves God and the other doesn't, but how can you be sure of this, when God after all is an idea?

Hitchens DID seem to have a good bit of vitriol for Mother Teresa. (Based on what I read in this essay: http://www.slate.com/id/2090083/ ) I find his comments about her idolatry of poverty, and the formal process of naming her a saint, especially interesting in light of the recent news about her private torment of Doubt.

new thread

Yahoo Jesuit group and Sean

I've been claiming that the Bush Admin. has been heavily influenced by individuals who are in turn influenced by Leo Strauss - whom some scholars are calling "the new Marx" as regards his potential influence on politics - tho now on the right. The article below, though a bit dated, gives a fairly scholarly if somewhat biased overview of Strauss' thought. (She doesn't like him because he does not assume equality as a moral ideal. But criticizing a thinker because they do not assume that equality is an objective moral value is not a real critique, since we are not supposed to assume that philosophers assume any moral values other than that reason is necessary to living well, both publically and privately.)

Having said this, the article offers some nice insight into certain aspects of the Bush Admin. and is a succint summary of the way Neo-Con Straussians think about their role in politics. A comment on Israel is needed here: It should be noted that Strauss was Jewish, and that there is thus an empirical but not essential linkage between neo-cons AS Straussians AND the use of American power in support of Israel. I do believe that this is another arena in which "noble lies" are quite blatantly told.

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5010.htm

Terry

Terry

Again, this has caused me to meditate on one of your presumptions, and I am afraid that I am not making much progress. Is there a meaningful difference between ASSUMING a value and espousing a value?

In other words, following your phrasing, Drury dislikes Strauss because he espouses inequality. This [you continue] is not a real critique of a philosopher, because philosophers are not required to espouse equality. Finally, [you add] philosophers are only required to espouse rationality. (Nevertheless, "A morality based on rationality is a fallacy.")

Never minding the other problematic issues implicit above, I see a rhetorical difference between "assume" and "espouse," but that is all. I cannot see the epistemological difference that you seem to suggest exists.

Insights welcome!

Sean

Sean

Actually, Straussians are not monolithic. In some sense I'm a Straussian - except Im also "religious". I think she was a bit "leftist shrill" in the sense that she was really motivated by a reaction to the feeling or idea by these particular Straussians that equality is bad - the whole Nietzsche critique. I did know a few guys in my program who might have been Straussian in that sense. (They were fairly snobby and did not like American democracy from a philosphical perspective. They also assumed that Christiaanity was 100% "Plato lite" - this being a theme of Marxists as well. They claim that Christianity is wholly derived from Plato - at least practically speaking. But what interests me about these guys I knew was their prior dispositions - ) Have you read "The Closing of the American Mind"? That book influenced me a great deal. What confuses me somewhat is that the book is in its sensibility actually much closer to the left in its "esoteric" critique of the specifically Lockean elements in the foundation of the United States - along the lines that scholar talked about. (Bloom between the lines makes it clear that he thinks the notion of Lockean equality underlying the US is not unambiguously good. As such, insofar as he has a deep critique of American foundations implicit in the book, he is not an American "conservative" - and in that sense, that scholar is correct- at least about Bloom - a siginficant influence on neo-cons as a movement today. But I also think she is correct in saying that most conservatives assume that Bloom is conservative unambiguously. The deep issue is that he may indeed be conservative, but not in the way American conservatives think he is - He would be more along the lines of a European conservative who values inequality and church and aristocractic sensibilities - with the qualifier that he was Jewish.)  Bloom had a significant effect on my thinking - and "The Closing of the American Mind" is considered to be a summary of Strauss' thought. Summary: Any "knee jerk" antipathy towards Strauss is due to his not assuming equality is good - a la Nietzche. I DID like her claim that these types can't simply enjoy life. What do you think of that latter very simple claim! I sometimes think about my own psychology - I donn't want what I call "bad psychology" influencing others. Nietzsche had a great critique of the West and even more so implicitly of America - but his solution or response to the problem was adolescent and not constructive. It was simply destructive, I Think.

Terry

Terry

Interesting! I get much intellectual pleasure out of contextualizing these positions and approaches.

Recently in a constitutional law class, we discussed the tension in American political culture between bottom-up governance and top-down (in plain speak) - that continues to this day. A very intense and wonderful illustration of this tension is found in a series of publications in the 1770s, John Adams (advocating rule by "Brahmins" and restraint of the "mob") v. Tom Paine (advocating rule by the people and restraint of the clergy and aristocracy). (Each thinks the other side smells bad - there's no accounting for taste!) The tension can also be read later in Jefferson and Hamilton's exchanges, with one irony being that each seemed to champion the opposite of his birthright. (Of course, these things are susceptible of oversimplification, like labeling states either red or blue.)

No, I haven't read the Closing of the American Mind, but I will put it on my list.

As for that last intriguing charge, that they can't simply enjoy life - I do think there is something to that. Could we put one on a Freudian couch without being accused of being reductive? I do see a fundamental insecurity in claiming superiority - both because one's status depends on others, and because one is always in danger of falling low. A contemporary psychologist would describe the first problem as "other-orientedness." Nietzsche seemed to be made so miserable by the existence of the rabble, but they were necessary to his value of triumph! (In contrast to a value of fairness/equality.) Last time I read Nietzsche I wished that I could have taken him traveling - sailing to the tropics, for instance, where one cannot help but be astonished by the beautiful ordinary. But he probably would have made me sick. Tom Paine, by contrast, strikes me as an excellent drinking partner, someone who is already turned on to fun. The former needs reformed, for his own and his neighbor's sake; the latter is a man you can count on. But by reformation of those emotive, long-suffering elites, I don't mean any religious plan - unless that involves assigning to the man the responsibility of the demon who haunts him. (It is wrong - on the grounds of fairness - to make others become soldiers in a man's private war against his demon.) As for the second problem, a king sits uneasily on his throne. What can we say? I don't envy him.

(This tension plays out in slightly different tones in Chinese philosophy with the advocates of Confucius on one side, and those of Lao Tzu on the other.)

I can see this tension in some of my past personal relationships with Straussian types (I don't mean you) - three "geniuses" who are not in touch with me for various reasons. (I can think of 3 off the top of my head.) I remember thinking: These others at whom you are sneering are not as dumb as you think they are; anyway, you may be smart, but why are you so sick?

(I come to take it as a given that true intelligence leads to wellness - & as a corollary to the individual, I believe this ought to be understood as applying to society as well. This is in contrast to the "strife as social tonic" article of faith.)

One former fellow law student here - he has left for a different law school - held a PhD on a topic of continental (European) philosophy before pursuing this JD. He was aggressively social but condescending in a sometimes nasty way. He suffered from constant migraines and indigestion, as if his brain was at war with his viscera. Is this a sign of philosophy? My answer was no. His answer was (impliedly) yes, because it shows an awareness of THE CRISIS!

And if we were back on that Freudian couch, is the crisis really as complicated as it is made out to be - the Death of God, civilization unhinged from its tribal origins, or the pressure of an overpopulated planet? Maybe it just comes from the trauma of abandonment in infancy (maternal coldness), or the adolescent's realization of his impending death?

Sean

new thread

Sean - I found myself thinking of you when I saw "Into the Wild" - not because I'd expect you to do something like Chris McCandless did - but because I see in you something of the spirit he had. Try to see this film!

Terry

A difference between McCandless and me (and I mean this respectfully) is that I am still alive. Part of that may be because even as a teenager I cast a wry eye on my own youthful enthusiasm. But the main part is luck.

You should read the book. It's a thin, fast read. I understand that the film is visually very beautiful - and I have a lot of respect for Sean Penn. He gives an interesting interview on the making of the film, and its content, to Charlie Rose, which you can find on the internet if you are interested in a conversation on the film's content. And you are! ;-) Eddie Vedder was also present. Good stuff. Thanks for thinking of me!

Sean

New thread:

To Yahoo group and Sean

This is an article from Commonweal from 10/07. I preface it with a paragraph of my own remarks:

One of the things that has interested me in my study of philosophy, religion is the notion that there seems to be a claim made by most prophets and moral philosophers that certitude is contrary to true religion. So for example Socrates' repeatedly tells us that he knows that he does not know 'the most important things'. And Jesus reprimands Thomas for needing to verify his existence by putting his fingers into his side. All sorts of remarks are made by primary prophets and philosophers that we are not to focus on gaining certitude, or that is, the inner conviction that we are right, either intellectually or morally.

Terry

The Trouble with Religion CERTAINTY IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR FAITH John Garvey

Religion, as it is ordinarily practiced, reconciles us-not to one another, in any interesting or profound way, but rather to the world as we would like to encounter it. If we are more or less liberal, it takes us easily into the world of liberal thought and its satisfactions, and if we are conservative, ditto. As someone once said of country music, when you’re drunk in a bar and hear it on the jukebox, it makes you think you’re right.

And this is precisely what is wrong about much, if not most, religion. Some of its atheist critics have a fair point: To the extent that it shores up a sense of certainty and reinforces the ego, religion is a damaging influence.

If the danger of conservative or reactionary religion is unquestioning certainty and dogmatic literalism, the danger of liberalism is its willingness to equate religion with personal taste and a tolerant worldview. What is lost in both views is the understanding that we must be transformed if we are to be what we are meant to be, that, as we are, we have been deformed, that our ordinary waking consciousness is at best a form of sleepwalking. It takes an effort, an ascetic struggle, to begin to be clear about anything. We must struggle for the beginning of clarity, and if we get to that beginning, we will not be satisfied with ourselves.

We will know that in every way we must be remade because of what we have been called to be, which has nothing to do with our politics or lifestyle. (What a shallow view of humanity is packed into that word!) We are called into a compassion that will bring us to a necessary discomfort; we will have to find ourselves in the company of people who are wounded and poor, and we will be there without the comfort of judgment.

Some critics of religion-Stanley Fish comes to mind-argue that religion is necessarily intolerant: If you believe X to be true, Y must be false, so off with Y’s head. Given the track record of armed religion, they have a point. But if you look at what serious Christians have understood to be the heart of Christianity, they really don’t. The desert fathers, for example, never judge others; seeing the sin of another, they turn the judgment against themselves. A serious understanding of the gospel would make me indifferent to what other people think or believe. It would focus me on how I get it wrong, not on how you have erred. It would have to do with metanoia, repentance, my own turning around. The work I must do is on my own clouded vision, the beam in my own eye.

But many conventional manifestations of religion do not do this. They see sin as always elsewhere, certainly not in me or my tribe. So some Christians look at homosexuals as the problem, while others point to those who despoil the environment, accumulate wealth, or favor the wars we hate-the list can be as long as we want to make it, and it’s pointless. To be of Christ’s mind means to empty ourselves, to hold on to nothing, including the list of others who are to blame.

Holding on to nothing means refusing to hold on to the need for assurance and certainty, the need to be right. This isn’t faith. Hebrews 11:1 tells us that faith is “the assurance of things hoped for.” This is not certainty as we ordinarily understand it. To hope for something is to await something, to care fervently that it comes to pass, and to know that in some corner of the heart we fear it may not. All the orientation here is toward the future. For the Christian, being prayerfully aware of the present also involves waiting. But much of the Christian community has lost this eschatological sense, which is the heart of the New Testament. “We do not know what we shall be, but we will see him as he is.” “Then we will know, as now we are known.” “Come, Lord Jesus.” And of course the words of the Lord’s Prayer: “Your kingdom come.”

The Resurrection of Jesus is the earliest sign of something yet to be realized, just as the Eucharist is the bread of the kingdom that is among us and still to come. This sense of the unrealized is the heart of the Christian story. That is why Christian faith, seen properly, can never reconcile us to any particular politics, or way of life, or even morality as we conventionally understand it. We await our completion. We do not now, and never can, possess or control what we are finally meant to become. Someone who loves us more than we could possibly love ourselves is in charge of that.

 

Terry

SOMETHING INTERESTING about the examples you choose is that they are amenable to so many interpretations (as to their "true message," or meaning). Indeed, is there even certainty about uncertainty? This goes a step further and by this time, anyone willing to make a casual foray into the dynamics of uncertainty has probably turned back for the comforts of home. I once met a southern youth preacher who assured me he had checked out the other religions - "Mohammedism, Buddhism, Hinduism" - and it wasn't long before he saw "how wrong they were." ANOTHER aside: "Doubting" Thomas' attitude ("I can't believe my eyes!") may have been exactly what allowed his later insights to be possible (in the gnostic gospel).

my remarks from prior post:

Some writers have argued that the modern West is on a "quest for certitude". I see the need for certitude to be particularly strong in the American psyche - on both the left and right in different respects. The article below is a nice discussion of why certitude is contrarty to true religion and spirituality. It's from a mainstream well known Catholic journal.

THE QUEST FOR CERTITUDE is an attitude that must be tied to scientific learning & exploration. If I continue to sail West, will I be able to get home again? If I power up this steam engine boiler, is it constructed strongly enough so it will not explode and kill me? If I approach the Moon at the correct trajectory, will I be able to sling-shot back to Earth in my space capsule? The answers to these questions are important! They are matters of life or death!

BUT WHAT happens when we apply this quest for tangible answers to what must fundamentally be intangible - because the intangible are ideas? I thought of you the other day when it dawned on me why it is I dislike the common way our culture uses the word "art." People typically use the word as if they are describing a concrete object. But this is a shallow attitude. "Art" is not ART. "Art" is an idea. (Ironically, MODERN/Post-Mod artists understand this, but are MISunderstood by the general public!) This observation is also true for the word "God."***

Sean

 

Terry

I just have one remark on your last email. This is your remark

You have three remarks at least! Don't be so humble!

THE QUEST FOR CERTITUDE is an attitude that must be tied to scientific learning & exploration. If I continue to sail West, will I be able to get home again? If I power up this steam engine boiler, is it constructed strongly enough so it will not explode and kill me? If I approach the Moon at the correct trajectory, will I be able to sling-shot back to Earth in my space capsule? The answers to these questions are important! They are matters of life or death!

Terry: I was talking though about a psychological attitude or a subjective need that seems to indicate something about the subject more than it does about reality - When Descartes stressed KNOWLEDGE or VERIFIC ATION that he could make the claims he was making , he basically changed the thrust and meaning of philosophy. Now the stress came to be on KNOWING in a very narrow way - as in "knowing gravity is real" or "knowing 5 + 5 = 10". My point is that this kind of knowing is a fundamentally different mode of accessing the real - and entails a different understanding OF the real - than what I loosely call PRE-modern spirit of the west.

Sean

Terry

An attitude that puts the myths open to question is one that threatens the old kind of "knowing." As for the debate on the "understanding OF the real," I have never gotten a clear idea of what you claim is the pre-modern method of "knowing." I get the sense that you imagine a hazy, comfortable faith enjoyed by "pre-moderns." Was this faith only possible before people asked pesky questions about others' assumptions? (Isn't this why Nietzsche disliked Socrates?) Did such a faith ever really exist? (Were pre-moderns simpletons? Or wise ones bathing in the bliss of existence? You should go to India!) Or is this a fantasy of a half-remembered childhood experience, before Mother or Father were found to be a disappointment?

Sean

Finally - when you mentioned that we NEED to know the matters you point to above - notice the nature of the OBJECTS focused on in this "need". - they get us to the foundation, but they in themselves do not make life worth living. There is a lot of nice discusison that can open up around the meaning of NEED - as in "what are the most important things in life"? In some obvious sense, they are food, clothing and shelter. But from a pre-modern spirit , or religious sensibility, the "most important things" become something akin to the Idea of the good, doing God's will, or God.

Terry :

That's interesting. But I don't see that I used the word "need." Maybe I did in context... (This does suggest a natural selection on modes of knowing.) At any rate, you seem to conflate philosophy with religion. It looks like sleight of hand. If you mean to say that my asserted separation of the two is a modern idea, I am not sure that I agree with that. If you mean to say that the two tend to be inextricable, I would probably agree, as they are both informed by values and beliefs and even ritual.

I have been reading a lot on contemporary Muslim legal thinking lately (for a course), and the thinking comports with your description of the "pre-modern spirit." Religious devotees, however, do not have a monopoly on an interest in the "good." Their claim that they do is not strengthened by showing a personal heritage touched by the Divine. After all, this is a common claim. It is also one that may arise sui generis from any individual.

As for "what makes life worth living," does a myth really provide much substance for this question? Yes, if being part of a grand story makes life worth living. But surely one narrates an involvement in a grand story, and does go on with life, even if he lacks personal knowledge of any given (broadly-validated) mythical narrative. We could speak of a narrative instinct.

You said:
When you speak of God being an Idea - you are speaking of the way this reference must be conceived or discussed. But to say this is not to say that God is not real in any robust sense of the term - e.g. that he is simply subjectivity expressing itself beautifully.

That bears repeating:
"[T]his is not to say that God is not real in any robust sense of the term - e.g. that he is simply subjectivity expressing itself beautifully." Do I understand you correctly? God is simply subjectivity expressing itself beautifully? What if he is subjectivity expressing itself grotesquely? Is that not God as well? Or is that not your idea of God? Will you qualify God? i.e.:

Is a requirement of the idea be that the idea be real? And not merely real, but robustly real? (Since we are writing prose, I doubt this has any meaning. At best, we are talking about the idea of an idea.)

Sean

 

Sean - I think you missed the first "not" in the above remark (see below where I repaste it)



That bears repeating:
"[T]his is not to say that God is not real in any robust sense of the term - e.g. that he is simply subjectivity expressing itself beautifully." Do I understand you correctly? God is simply subjectivity expressing itself beautifully? What if he is subjectivity expressing itself grotesquely? Is that not God as well? Or is that not your idea of God? Will you qualify God? i.e.:

Sean - I think you are speaking generally as if you're a minority position that is defending a somewhat unorthodox view. I would suggest, as I have before, that you are more in the majority today than I am - and that to repeat a claim again you really don't understand true religion. Your questions and themes are seeming to repeat. There is no claim by those who preach in the vein of religious culture, what I'm calling "true religion" that all will "get it", and there is no claim by them to try to demonstrate that they are "certainly right". The epistemic issues and issues of certitude aren't in the arena. At at some point the issue will have to come up in this discussion - that not all will get it - and I would assume that this would include those who adopt the spirit of modern Cartesian philosophy and perhaps one bent of Socratic philosophy. This "limit" to grasping what I'm pointing to will come up in individuals who seems to accept many of the implicit values concerning both the ways and ends of life positited by modern philosophy, or better, the spirit of modern philosophy.

I would also say simply that I "know" God exists in the way that I've tried to explain. I've "experienced" him, etc. etc. This is not something I can prove, but this is not part of that arena - to demonstrate certitude. You're seem kind of intent on reducing this to psychology, and your use of the term "myth" shows me that you see it as simply subjective in the way I denied it was in the remark above - the one with the original "not".

Terry

 

Terry

Well, this is a problem, isn't it? For starters, I apologize if I offended you. We are having communication problems when we both seem to be repeating ourselves. I truly did not understand the quoted passage, which was why I quoted it. I understood the "e.g." to create a new meaning for the entire clause, rather than only the dependent clause.

At any rate, it is clear you claim a greater compass for "God" than the psychological reality possessed by a subject. This is common. But the "know" line of argument has only semantic value. It would be clearer to say, "I feel that God is objectively real." ("I know that God is objectively real" is a show-stopper because it puts God on the same plane as a particular fact. Contrary to your claim, this is the majority position in the world today, at least among Muslims and Christians. Secularists are the majority only in certain circles.)

"I feel God is objectively real" is a matter of faith (and a different kind of show-stopper). Faith, as you seem to put it, is a matter for followers of true religion. (I suggested India to illustrate some of the many varieties of true religion.)

To say that I do not "understand" true religion is to say that I do not "grasp" the power of faith. Furthermore, the correct method for understanding and grasping faith is emotional experience. I gather this is your argument. As an accusation, it is unbecoming.

You suggest (contrary to the thrust of history) that moderns have limited their way of knowing. More tangibly, they have limited their grasp, which is to say that they have limited their feelings. In my personal experience, however, I find that it is precisely religious people (but not truly religious people, to accept your distinction, but without regard to creed) who have most limited their feelings. This limitation is proof of the insufficiency of contemporary religion as a social convention. (It preaches compassion, for instance, while being unable to teach how one becomes a compassionate person.) This insufficiency is why contemporary society often seems to lack soul - religion has failed its followers. This is not to say that "God" has failed his followers. (The preceding thoughts form a major narrative theme of the past five hundred years of Western religion.)

Myths are metaphorically "true." They are shared throughout the world: how could this be "merely subjective" phenomena? (You continue to misunderstand me.) You may dislike this as being reductive, but you put forth no argument as to why it is descriptively inaccurate. On the other hand, you do show that the reductionism insults the truth of a process whereby local fantasy is elevated to cosmological reality. Does it necessarily mean that the process is any less wonderful or mysterious?

How is the power of faith so easily stymied? In short, isn't this why one does not "cast pearls before swine"? I think that is the answer. The defense of faith is that faith makes one feel good. Feeling is its own justification.

Sean

11/13/07

Sean

Sean - I could not undue to "Italics" in the last email that you had inserted at one point. I didn't mean to make the remarks look more "stressed"! I was also in a bad mood when I wrote that, though now I forget why.

I kept some of your remarks below and made some comments.


At any rate, it is clear you claim a greater compass for "God" than the psychological reality possessed by a subject. This is common. But the "know" line of argument has only semantic value. It would be clearer to say, "I feel that God is objectively real." ("I know that God is objectively real" is a show-stopper because it puts God on the same plane as a particular fact. Contrary to your claim, this is the majority position in the world today, at least among Muslims and Christians. Secularists are the majority only in certain circles.)

Me: I thought yyour remark was correct - the "know" line of argument has only semantic value - and I forgot that I myself have been thinking about the issue of "knowledge" in relation to transcendent or non-empirical aspects of reality.. I'm thinking of the way that Plato uses "knowledge" in the Allegory, where its clear that the object (the highest good) is akin to a religious object. Moderns wouldn't use "Knowledge" in relation to that KIND of object - and this is your point. I agree. This is why I put "know" in quotes. The verbs I usually use are "intuit" and "understand", with the qualificaiton that the latter term is meant in the WAY that Augustine and othersi n early Christianity use the term "understanding of God's will". (They dont mean by it what Descartes would mean when he says he knows something is real.)

"I feel God is objectively real" is a matter of faith (and a different kind of show-stopper). Faith, as you seem to put it, is a matter for followers of true religion. (I suggested India to illustrate some of the many varieties of true religion.)

To say that I do not "understand" true religion is to say that I do not "grasp" the power of faith. Furthermore, the correct method for understanding and grasping faith is emotional experience. I gather this is your argument. As an accusation, it is unbecoming.

Yes- that is where my being in a bad mood came in. You caught me! I knew I shouldn't have said it.

I thought your remarks just below - where I bolded - were right on. I pasted them and sent them to my Jesuit on-line group. I think of all the things I read you write, this is the best insight/argument. The way Jesuits take this kind of insight into account - and most religious ORDERS (as contrasted with parish priests, who vary much more by individual personal belief set - e.g. "traditonalist" or "liberal/modern"). By the way, in regards to PSCHOLOGY, in my language, "modern" is 'on track' and "tradionalists" is way off base - which is to copy what you say below.

Sean's remark:
You suggest (contrary to the thrust of history) that moderns have limited their way of knowing. More tangibly, they have limited their grasp, which is to say that they have limited their feelings. In my personal experience, however, I find that it is precisely religious people (but not truly religious people, to accept your distinction, but without regard to creed) who have most limited their feelings. This limitation is proof of the insufficiency of contemporary religion as a social convention. (It preaches compassion, for instance, while being unable to teach how one becomes a compassionate person.) This insufficiency is why contemporary society often seems to lack soul - religion has failed its followers. This is not to say that "God" has failed his followers. (The preceding thoughts form a major narrative theme of the past five hundred years of Western religion.)

Myths are metaphorically "true." They are shared throughout the world: how could this be "merely subjective" phenomena? (You continue to misunderstand me.) You may dislike this as being reductive, but you put forth no argument as to why it is descriptively inaccurate. On the other hand, you do show that the reductionism insults the truth of a process whereby local fantasy is elevated to cosmological reality. Does it necessarily mean that the process is any less wonderful or mysterious?

Terry's remark: I thought you might mean this - but do sense at times that by "myth" you mean "not real". It is obvious that a lot of intellectual types who are against "religion" use the claim that religion is "myth" as a not so sublte way to say it is "not real". But of course the whole issue of what form the real takes is open to question. All reality is not like a Cartesiean object, nor again, reducible to psychology.

Sean's remark :
How is the power of faith so easily stymied? In short, isn't this why one does not "cast pearls before swine"? I think that is the answer. The defense of faith is that faith makes one feel good. Feeling is its own justification.

Terry's remark: Why did you say this last remark? Here I thought you were on solid ground anthropologically in the prior remarks and you threw in this last remark - in regards to the kind of religions and philosophy I am interested in, no one would argue that feeling ALONE is the GROUND of religious experience, or the intellectual justification for the practice of religion. In terms of the roots or origins of this claim, it feels Rousseauian to me and maybe Nietzschiean. Maybe Thoreau and a bit of radical Emerson thrown in???

Terry

11/14/07

 

Sean,

I re read my remarks right after I mailed them, instead of editing them first, and realized I did not finish a thought. Here it is:


I find that the way Jesuits take this kind of insight into account - and most religious orders - is to stress experience over theory or DOCTRINAL claims. They talk about the "felt experience" of God, without reducing it to MERE feeling. The nature of the reality which is "related to" in this experience is ultimately a mystery. Catholic culture - in contrast to Protestant - is more "open to" the reality of mystery.

Terry

 

The remarks below were posted Jan 10 08

Another opinion piece arguing that Obama is the better choice over
Clinton - again in part because he doesn't invoke antipathy in the way
Clinton does. If nothing else, I want to add that Clinton will motivate the base on
the right. This seems obvious. Obama will not have this effect - and
from what I've seen in Republican circles he's the best liked Democrat.
This is saying a lot.

Terry

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/opinion/18brooks.html

Terry

i agree. i feel that brooks is more on target than many of the ardent pro-clintonites. there seems to be a certain urban, progressive baby boomer clinton block that is so used to running things, at least in their offices and homes, that they (even recently) pronounce with an obnoxious certainty that hillary will be the next president.

...

i do think that baby boomers learned a certain view about the purpose and meaning of the world that often gets them (and those in their charge, like the country) into trouble. '92 was significant generationally for the WWII generation (Reagan, Bush I, then Bob Dole as the contender) yielding to the first baby boomer president. Clinton's two terms was followed by Bush II's two terms, and those two may have a lot more in common than is generally recognized, though really it would be hard to think of two more contrasting individuals/presidents. obama, i think, is the first real generation X candidate. i feel like i "get" where he is coming from. i think some baby boomer pundits, and hillary, don't.
Sean

Sean

what is interesting is that that generation is perhaps the most idealistic in American history. And my political-philosophy "sources" tell me that idealism when it takes itself too seriously is a serious cause for concern! The basic theme that runs throughout the history of western political philosophy is this in a nutshell: At first glance to the layperson it may seem that the purpose of politics is to make society deeply morally virtuous. But almost all top phil. that also talk about political foundations suggest always subtly and never directly that the purpose of the wise statesman (the founder) is to create a foundation which MINIMIZES BAD THINGS - which we can take to be chaos, violence and poverty. The end of the good statesman is NOT to make society virtuous, in any direct way at least, and certainly not in any way that those who are coming out of a "revelation" (religion) tradition will propose. But the reason for NOT focusing on the deeper good is NOT what some liberals think it is: To respect the diverse opinions of all. Even this last value is for the sake of avoiding a bad, and is not considered a deep moral good in itself.

Re what you said about Bush and Clinton having more in common than may at first seem - I see both Bush and Clinton as overly zealous in their moral passion.

Terry

 

Terry

I am taking your points in a new light. thank you. these past few months i have been delving fairly deeply into islamic political thought - particularly modern. one theme is a great emphasis on the idealism of purifying society with the truth of islam, and bringing man into a correct relationship with god. the idealism is not complemented with pragmatic or technical "know how" regarding the construction of domestic institutions. in fact, making an aspect of society more "islamic" requires deconstruction, which is only replaced with "faith."

i don't know if you have read any v.s. naipaul, by the way, but i think you might really enjoy his nonfiction on faith, modernity and post-colonialism.